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1. INTRODUCTION 
Arising in the midst of distinctive political and ecological 
climates at different times during the last century, national 
conservation regimes in Australia, Germany, and the United States 
were nevertheless prompted by the same uniquely modern 
concern about the status of threatened wildlife.  Despite their 
common objective to address this concern, the iterations of national 
conservation regimes following the U.S. Endangered Species Act of 
1973 (“ESA”)1 are characterized by a diversity of means, even 
among countries sharing a common law legal system.  Although 
other national legislatures enacted a variety of statutes with similar 
objectives over the past few decades, the ESA still stands out as an 
exceptional model among common and civil law countries alike, 
utilizing a highly centralized regime to directly protect threatened 
species. 
While the counterpart provisions for species protection in an 
Australian statute—the Environment Protection and Biodiversity 
Conservation Act of 1999 (“EPBC Act”)—are substantially different 
from the ESA in their reach and in their inclusion of state 
decisionmaking, perhaps unexpectedly, many provisions in the 
comparable German statute are similar to the EPBC Act.  These 
similarities call to mind the often-dubious distinctions between 
 
* Articles Editor, University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 32; J.D., 2011, University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
1 See Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2006) (“It is . . . 
declared to be the policy of Congress that all Federal departments and agencies 
shall seek to conserve endangered species and threatened species and shall utilize 
their authorities in furtherance of [these] purposes . . . .”). 
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civil law and common law countries, particularly on the level of 
specific areas of law.  At least within the limited scope of the 
conservation regimes examined here, variations between the 
means employed in two common law countries—the United States 
and Australia—are often greater than those between a common 
law and civil law country—Australia and Germany.  As this 
Comment will show, the reason for this divergence is political:  
although the statute establishing the Australian regime was 
enacted by a legislature with near-plenary constitutional authority 
over environmental matters, its state-centric provisions were 
inspired primarily by the political context in which it was enacted. 
Nevertheless, the facially divergent Australian and American 
statutory regimes have faced similar criticisms after several years 
of implementation.  Both regimes have been criticized as slow-to-
react and either plagued by under-enforcement or unpredictable 
enforcement.  The similar criticisms of the Australian regime may 
be explained by its implementation.  The greater cooperative 
mechanisms that distinguished the Australian from the American 
regime have been underutilized in practice, and as a result 
enforcement is burdened by a lessened degree of responsiveness 
and is subject to the vacillations of political expediency on a federal 
level.  These inefficiencies are also characteristic of a highly 
centralized conservation regime, which is exemplified by the ESA.  
In both cases, the mechanisms for state cooperation are inadequate 
or lay dormant, leaving unrealized the potential efficacy of either 
regime. 
Following more than ten years of implementation of the 
Australian statute, this Comment will recount the origins of the 
new cooperative conservation provisions, how the failures of its 
implementation relate to underutilization of these provisions, and 
what can be learned from the failings and successes of the EPBC 
Act—one of the most recently enacted federal environmental 
statutes. 
First, by explaining the constitutional power available to 
national legislatures in the environmental arena and the political 
considerations prevailing at the time of enactment, the latter will 
be shown to have been the primary factor affecting the divergence 
of the Australian statute from the mechanisms of the ESA.  Second, 
the provisions of the three statutes will be compared in order to 
highlight the similarities between the Australian and German 
regimes and the differences between Australian and American 
regimes, with particular focus on the mechanisms for cooperative 
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efforts involving the states.  Third, this Comment will survey how 
the Australian statute as implemented has been subject to criticism 
similar to that directed toward the ESA.  Finally, this Comment 
will contend that the failure of the federal Australian legislators to 
utilize the substantial cooperative mechanisms in the new EPBC 
Act demonstrates that the cooperative mechanisms in a federal 
conservation statute must be accompanied by a robust method for 
ensuring their utilization. 
2. THE ECOLOGICAL CONTEXT 
As an initial matter, an undeniable aspect of the context in 
which national biodiversity legislation arises is, of course, the 
presence of biota of particular concern that will be affected by 
policy.  If the prominence of threatened species varied significantly 
between the examined countries, it is conceivable that this alone 
might account for the differences between the regimes.  This is not 
the case. 
Threatened endemic species are readily identifiable in the 
isolated continent of Australia2 and within the vast range of 
wilderness in North America.  Australia is home to 7.8% of the 
world’s species, most of which are endemic.3  Since the time of 
European settlement, the persistence of native populations has 
been in steady decline.4  By these indices the importance of an 
effective conservation regime is clear. 
However, the protection of wildlife from the harmful 
encroachment of civilization may intuitively seem an unlikely 
concern in long-settled Central Europe.  To be sure, little or no true 
 
2 See BEN BOER & GRAEME WIFFEN, HERITAGE LAW IN AUSTRALIA 142 (2006) 
(estimating that approximately 85% of flowering plants, 84% of mammals, 45% of 
birds, and 89% “of inshore, temperate-zone fish are endemic . . . [to] Australia.”). 
3 See ARTHUR D. CHAPMAN, AUSTL. GOV’T DEP’T OF THE ENV’T, WATER, 
HERITAGE & THE ARTS, NUMBERS OF LIVING SPECIES IN AUSTRALIA AND THE WORLD 7 
(2d ed. 2009), available at http://www.environment.gov.au/biodiversity/abrs/ 
publications/other/species-numbers/2009/pubs/nlsaw-2nd-complete.pdf (“For 
example, 41.3% of the chordates are endemic (including 87% of mammals, 45% of 
birds, 93% of reptiles, 94% of frogs) and some 92% of the vascular plants. . . . [T]he 
number of Australian species under threat are 246 chordates . . . 1260 vascular 
plants . . . ,[and] 32 invertebrates . . . .”).  See also id. at 11 tbl. 2. 
4 See A Delahunt et al., The National Estate, Forests and Fauna, in CONSERVATION 
OF AUSTRALIA’S FOREST FAUNA 245 (Daniel Lunney ed., 1991) (discussing the 
potential decline of National Estate areas in Australia). 
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virgin forestland remains in Central Europe,5 including Germany.  
However, there are populations of species endemic to Germany 
presently in decline.  About 3,000 ferns and flowering plants are 
endemic to Germany, and almost a third are at least at risk of 
extinction.6  According to an influential “Red List” published by 
the International Union for Conservation of Nature (“IUCN”), in 
Germany seventy-five species of flora and fauna are designated as 
threatened.7 
In contrast, 849 species in Australia and 1157 species in the 
United States8 are considered threatened.  However, considering 
the much smaller total area of Germany, the proportion of 
threatened species to the total size of the country is higher than in 
the United States, although this does not speak to the density or 
specific threat level of populations.9  By these indices, species 
 
5 See, e.g., G. Frank & F. Müller, Voluntary Approaches in Protection of Forests in 
Austria, 6 ENVTL. SCI. & POL’Y 261, 262 (2003) (“Except in the Alps and the 
inaccessible mountains of the Carpathians and the Balkan range, no true virgin 
forests have remained in Central Europe.”) (references omitted). 
6 See FED. MINISTRY FOR THE ENV’T, NATURE CONSERVATION & NUCLEAR SAFETY, 
NATIONAL STRATEGY ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 17 (Jonna Küchler-Krischun & 
Alfred Maria Walter eds., 2007) [hereinafter NATIONAL STRATEGY ON BIOLOGICAL 
DIVERSITY] http://www.bmu.de/files/english/pdf/application/pdf/broschuere 
_biolog_vielfalt_strategie_en_bf.pdf (specifying that the Red List estimates that 
26.8% of endemic plant species and 36% of endemic animal species are currently 
at risk of extinction); see also FED. MINISTRY FOR THE ENV’T, NATURE CONSERVATION 
& NUCLEAR SAFETY, REPORT ON THE STATE OF NATURE BY THE GERMAN FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT FOR THE 16TH ELECTORAL TERM 17 (Ingelore Gödeke & Alexandra 
Liebing eds., 2009), available at http://www.bmu.de/files/english/pdf/ 
application/pdf/bericht_lage_natur_lp_16_en_bf.pdf (estimating that due to the 
effects of global warming “about 20 to 30% of all species which have been 
assessed . . . will face a higher risk of extinction”). 
7 See Biodiversity and Protected Areas—Germany, EARTHTRENDS, 1–2 (2003), 
http://earthtrends.wri.org/pdf_library/country_profiles/bio_cou_276.pdf 
(listing twelve higher plants, eleven mammals, five breeding birds, and six fishes 
as being designated as threatened in Germany). 
8 See INT’L UNION FOR CONSERVATION OF NATURE, TABLE 5: THREATENED SPECIES 
IN EACH COUNTRY (TOTALS BY TAXONOMIC GROUP) 4 (2011), available at 
http://www.iucnredlist.org/documents/summarystatistics/2011_2_RL_Stats_ 
Table5.pdf (reporting that 67 plants, 55 mammals, 52 birds, 43 reptiles, 47 
amphibians, 103 fishes, 168 molluscs, and 314 other invertebrates are recognized 
as threatened in Australia; 243 plants, 37 mammals, 76 birds, 36 reptiles, 56 
amphibians, 183 fish, 268 molluscs, and 258 other invertebrates are recognized as 
threatened in the United States). 
9 See VALUATION AND CONSERVATION OF BIODIVERSITY: INTERDISCIPLINARY 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 111 (Michael 
Markussen et al. eds., 2005) (“The patchy landscape of Central Europe abounds 
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protection is a justifiable priority not only in these common law 
countries but in German environmental policy as well. 
3. CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT: ESTABLISHMENT AND 
STRENGTHENING OF FEDERAL AUTHORITY OVER THE ENVIRONMENT 
When the legislatures of each of the examined countries 
enacted comprehensive legislation on a national level, in each case 
it was certain that the enactment abided by the constitutional 
allocation of legislative power.  However, in Australia the 
recognition of this power in the environmental area was recent, 
and in Germany the constraints imposed by constitutional law 
significantly limited the enactment of a comprehensive 
environmental statute. 
An examination of constitutional jurisprudence in Germany, 
the United States, and Australia reveals that although all three 
states are federal polities, the distribution of environmental 
lawmaking power between their respective federal and state level 
governments varies significantly.  The distribution of power in the 
Australian and American federal systems is similar, though the 
concurrent powers in Australia are much broader; both models are 
very different from the cooperative model of federalism in 
Germany, which provides for a complex interdependent paradigm 
of decisionmaking. 
Power is much more concentrated in Germany than in the 
United States because of the partial fusion of powers of the federal 
council that represents the Länder (states), known as the Bundesrat 
(second chamber), and the executive.10  But environmental 
legislation has remained largely fragmented.  The German 
legislative process, unlike the American and Australian, serves as 
an impediment to comprehensive reform since the Länder are 
restrained by the necessity of broad agreement before new 
environmental policy is enacted.11  This has been an obstacle to 
 
with small, often fragmented populations . . . . Additionally, Germany is very 
poor in endemic species, and there are no hot spots of species diversity . . . .”). 
10 See R. DANIEL KELEMEN, THE RULES OF FEDERALISM: INSTITUTIONS AND 
REGULATORY POLITICS IN THE EU AND BEYOND 79 (2004) (explaining how the 
structure of the German government leads to more concentrated power than in 
the United States or other EU countries). 
11 See Helmut Wiesenthal, German Unification and ‘Model Germany’: An 
Adventure in Institutional Conservatism, in GERMANY: BEYOND THE STABLE STATE 37, 
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long-sought reforms in the environmental area.  The power of the 
Bundesrat in Germany generally causes an even higher degree of 
fragmentation of power at the federal level than the Australian 
model and a lower degree of discretion exercised by the states in 
implementing federal policy.12  However, in the area of species 
protection, the autonomy the Länder exercise in implementing 
federal law more closely resembles the autonomy the Australian 
states exercise in this area than the American states. 
Regarding specific lawmaking power, the U.S. Constitution, 
like the Constitution of Australia, does not allocate the competency 
to regulate nature conservation.  In either case, the concept of 
“environmental conservation” was simply not a part of the 
contemporary lexicon.  As previously mentioned, in both countries 
this area of regulation was traditionally within the competency of 
state governments, and remained so because of the residual nature 
of state power.  Only after judicial interpretation of constitutional 
provisions broadened the authority of the federal government to 
legislate did it become clear that constitutional challenge did not 
threaten the ESA and the EPBC Act. 
In the United States, the broad expansion of congressional 
authority to legislate occurred long before the enactment of the 
ESA.  However, the Supreme Court did not clarify specific 
authority to enact wildlife regulation under the Commerce Clause 
until the 1970s.  Even so, at the time of the ESA’s enactment, the 
Court had not struck down legislation as an unconstitutional 
exercise of the Commerce Clause since the New Deal.13  Thus, it 
did not appear that the ESA was in danger of serious constitutional 
scrutiny.  In 1977, the Court indicated that Congress had broad 
power to regulate wildlife under the Commerce Clause in a 
 
52–53 (Herbert Kitschelt & Wolfgang Streeck eds., 2004) (describing Germany’s 
system of cooperative federalism as limiting autonomy for “bold initiatives” and 
thus favorable to the status quo). 
12 See KELEMEN, supra note 10, at 20–21 (noting that because “Germany 
combines parliamentary government with the existence of a powerful upper 
chamber” it provides for less discretion compared to the Australian government). 
13 See id. at 59 (explaining that the Supreme Court has interpreted the 
Commerce Clause broadly and as such has “not struck down a single federal 
regulation claiming to promote interstate commerce since the New Deal”). 
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decision that upheld the regulation of fish in state waters.14  Two 
further decisions in 1979 reified this holding.15 
A somewhat recent constitutional challenge to a regulation 
promulgated pursuant to the ESA made clear that Congress has 
authority to regulate wildlife pursuant to this power even after the 
Lopez decision.16  In Gibbs v. Babbitt, private landowners challenged 
a regulation that forbade the “taking” of endangered wolves on 
private land.17  The Fourth Circuit concluded that the regulation 
was constitutional, since “[t]he taking of red wolves implicates a 
variety of commercial activities,” and killing of red wolves in the 
aggregate affects interstate commerce.18  This decision confirmed 
Congress’ ability to regulate “takings,” even on privately owned 
land. 
The broadening of federal legislative authority in the 
environmental arena was comparatively recent in Australian 
jurisprudence.  Although matters of land management are vested 
in the states, the Constitution of Australia does not explicitly 
address the power to enact environmental legislation.19 
Like the enumerated powers of Congress in Article 1 of the U.S. 
Constitution, Section 51 of the Australian Constitution lists the 
“heads of power” originally ceded by the Australian colonies to the 
 
14 See Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 286–87 (1977) (holding 
that the Federal Enrollment and Licensing Act preempted Virginia state law, and 
upholding that Act as constitutional); see also MICHAEL J. BEAN & MELANIE J. 
ROWLAND, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 23 (3d ed. 1997) (noting 
that while the fish in Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc. were migratory, the basis for 
finding federal authority was grounded in the vessels’ interstate movement when 
searching for fish and transporting the catches back to processing plants). 
15 See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 326 (1979) (holding the definition of 
commerce equally extends to federal restrictions on state legislation as well as 
congressional action); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63–64 (1979) (holding that the 
Eagle Protection Act and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act were valid). 
16 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (holding that while 
Congress had broad lawmaking authority under the Commerce Clause, the power 
was limited, and did not extend so far from “commerce” as to authorize the 
regulation of the carrying of handguns, especially when there was no evidence 
that carrying guns affected the economy on a massive scale). 
17 See Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000). 
18 Id. at 492–93 (explaining that there is a valid federal scheme for protecting 
and conserving “valuable wildlife resources important to the welfare of [the] 
country”). 
19 See AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION S 51 (enumerating the powers of the 
Parliament). 
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Commonwealth Parliament.20  These matters fall within the 
“concurrent power” of the Commonwealth.  Pursuant to Section 
107, state parliaments may legislate in the areas of concurrent 
jurisdiction.21  For the most part, since legislative authority in 
Australia is held concurrently, unlike the United States there is 
high probability of conflict between a valid state law and a valid 
federal law,22 in which case inconsistent state legislation is 
“invalid.”23  As the environment was not mentioned within the 
original “heads of power,” legislation related to environmental 
matters was considered within a residual power left to the states. 
After the Federation was formed, the Australian 
Commonwealth relied on its “trade and commerce” power to enact 
a few pieces of species protection legislation, including the 
regulation of international trade in endangered birds.24  The very 
limited nature of the Environment Protection (Impact of Proposals) 
Act of 1974, which applied only to decisions involving the 
Commonwealth, reflected a narrow interpretation of 
Commonwealth that was undisturbed until as recently as the 
1980s.  The anemic trade and commerce power still lacks the 
expansive capability of its American counterpart, the Commerce 
Clause.25 
 
20 See SURI RATNAPALA, AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: FOUNDATIONS AND 
THEORY 204–07 (2d ed. 2007) (describing the Australian scheme of distributing 
power into various exclusive and shared competencies). 
21 Id. at 206 (“The provision implies that in the absence of exclusive vesting, 
State Parliaments may also legislate on subjects within the Commonwealth’s 
jurisdiction.”). 
22 Id. at 208 (explaining that the Constitution’s response is to give precedence 
to federal law through Section 109, which “is activated only when a valid federal 
law is in conflict with a valid State law”). 
23 See AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION S 109 (“When a law of a State is inconsistent 
with a law of the Commonwealth, the latter shall prevail, and the former shall, to 
the extent of the inconsistency, be invalid.”). 
24 See ALLAN HAWKE, AUSTL. GOV’T DEP’T OF THE ENV’T, WATER, HERITAGE & 
THE ARTS, INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION AND BIODIVERSITY 
CONSERVATION ACT 1999: INTERIM REPORT 8 [¶ 2.1] [hereinafter HAWKE INTERIM 
REPORT], available at http://www.environment.gov.au/epbc/review/ 
publications/pubs/interim-report.pdf (discussing the Commonwealth’s 
prohibition on the importation of specific bird species in 1908 and 1909). 
25 See Cheryl Saunders, The Constitutional Division of Powers with Respect to the 
Environment in Australia, in FEDERALISM AND THE ENVIRONMENT: ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICYMAKING IN AUSTRALIA, CANADA, AND THE UNITED STATES 55, 64 (Kenneth M. 
Holland et al. eds., 1996) (noting a lack of an Australian equivalent to the 
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Compared to the United States, the Australian High Court only 
recently began to expand the constitutional role of the 
Commonwealth in the environmental arena.  The Franklin Dam 
Case in 1983 opened the doors to new environmental legislation 
pursuant to the “external affairs” power, deciding that the 
Commonwealth could act to block a state-approved dam in an area 
on the World Heritage List pursuant to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (“CBD”).26  The High Court made it clear that 
the Commonwealth could act to implement any obligations under 
an international treaty, an expansive recognition of power that has 
not been nearly realized in the environmental area to this day.  The 
legislation upheld in the Franklin Dam Case was also constitutional 
pursuant to the “corporations” head of power.27  Since this case, 
the Court’s interpretation of the breadth of Commonwealth power 
has continued to grow.28 
Turning to the division of constitutional lawmaking power in 
Germany, although authority to legislate in the area of nature 
conservation was not addressed in the original Basic Law for the 
Federal Republic of Germany (“Basic Law”) of 1949, an 
amendment to the German constitution in 1969 allowed the federal 
government to issue “framework” legislation in this area.29  
 
expansive commingling doctrine found in the United States); see also Greg Taylor, 
The Commerce Clause—Commonwealth Comparisons, 24 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 
235, 246–48 (2001) (explaining the rejection of the doctrine of commingling and 
comparing the American interpretation of the Commerce Clause generally). 
26 See Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1, 5 (Austl.) (holding that the 
federal legislation was constitutional under Section 51 (xxix)). 
27 See AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION S 51(xx) (detailing that Parliament may 
legislate with respect to “[f]oreign corporations, and trading or financial 
corporations formed within the limits of the Commonwealth”). 
28 But see GRAEME APLIN, AUSTRALIANS AND THEIR ENVIRONMENT 168 (1998) 
(“The Federal Government’s environmental role is limited to areas involving its 
external or foreign affairs responsibilities, its own property and activities, and 
matters delegated to it by the states.”). 
29 See Gesetz zur Änderung des Grundgesetzes [Law Amending Basic Law], 
May 12, 1969, BGBL. I at 363 (Ger.), amending GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE 
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949, 
BGBL. I, art. 75 § 3 (Ger.) (granting a federal competency over “das Jagdwesen, 
den Naturschutz und die Landschaftspflege” [hunting, protection of nature and 
care of the countryside]); see also KELEMEN, supra note 10, at 82 (2004) (explaining 
that under the amendment the federal government “could issue legislation 
establishing general principles and goals, but could not issue detailed 
regulations”). 
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According to Articles 83–87 of the Basic Law, the Länder are 
generally responsible for the execution of federal legislation.30  
Framework legislation promulgated guidelines on a federal level 
that called for the enactment of more specific legislation by the 
Länder.31 
This feature distinguishes environmental legislation in 
Germany from its American and Australian counterparts, as there 
is a comparative lack of ability to control the administration 
beyond the guidelines set out in regulations and framework law.  
However, as a part of the response to a perceived encroachment on 
the authority of the Länder, the provision for framework legislation 
in the Basic Law was deleted as part of federalism reform in 2006.32 
Nevertheless, the German Federal Nature Conservation Act 
(“the German Act”), the primary conservation statute in Germany, 
was enacted as framework legislation.33  This, therefore, gave the 
Länder responsibility to concretize its framework in a way that 
would be considered an unconstitutional commandeering of state 
 
30 See GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] 
[GG] [BASIC LAW], MAY 23, 1949, BGBL. I, art. 83–90 (describing the specifics of 
execution by the Länder in light of federal oversight and commission, and as 
pertaining to particular domains such as defense, nuclear energy, air and rail 
transport, and posts and telecommunications). 
31 See KELEMEN, supra note 10, at 82–83 (“[A] 1972 amendment added waste 
disposal, air pollution control, and noise abatement as areas of concurrent federal-
state legislative competence.”). 
32 See Gesetz zur Änderung des Grundgesetzes [Law Amending Basic Law], 
Aug. 28, 2006, BGBL. I at 2034, art. 1, § 8 (Ger.) (“Die Artikel 74a und 75 werden 
aufgehoben” [“Articles 74a and 75 are hereby repealed”].); see also Arthur 
Gunlicks, German Federalism Reform: Part One, 8 GER. L.J. 111, 122–23 (2007) 
(considering the repeal of Article 75 to be a natural result of the Federal 
Constitutional Court decisions that placed significant limits on the federal 
government’s power to regulate education under the Article). 
33 Gesetz über Naturschutz und Landschaftspflege, Bundesnaturschutzgesetz 
[BNatSchG] [Federal Nature Conservation Act], Mar. 25, 2002, BGBL. I at 1193, § 
71 (Ger.) [hereinafter German Federal Nature Conservation Act] (“Die 
Verpflichtung der Länder gemäß Artikel 75 Abs. 3 des Grundgesetzes . . . im 
Übrigen innerhelb von drei Jahren nach dem Inkrafttreten dieses Gesetzes zu 
erfüllen” [“The obligation of the federal states according to Art. 75(3) of the 
Constitution must be fulfilled . . . within three years after the entry into force of 
this Act”].), reprinted in and translated in GERMAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR 
PRACTITIONERS 683 (Horst Schlemminger & Claus-Peter Martens eds., Jane 
Martens trans., 2d ed. 2004). 
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authority in the United States.34  In fact, the only way that Congress 
could enact a similar program compelling states to enact 
biodiversity legislation would be through conditional spending or 
conditional preemption.35 
4. THE PREVAILING POLITICAL CONTEXT AT ENACTMENT 
The concerns that gave rise to the examined regimes are of 
recent vintage relative to the history of wildlife law generally.  The 
entire legal history of “wildlife law,” loosely defined, may be 
characterized as a global development that begins with basic ideas 
about the “ownership” of wildlife that evolve into modern 
concerns about conservation of biodiversity.36  The twentieth 
century terms “biodiversity” and “conservation” that now 
permeate species protection in the regimes compared here 
originated recently, relative to the whole evolution of this area of 
policy. 
Importantly, the incorporation of these terms into floor debates 
and statutes reflected a sea change in the popular conception of 
man’s relationship to wildlife.  This change led to the emergence of 
two legal developments:  an expansion of the scope of wildlife law 
from management to conservation and strengthened authority 
over wildlife on a national level. 
Despite plenary constitutional authority over environmental 
legislation on a federal level, prevailing political concerns 
ultimately restrained the mechanisms employed by the Australian 
regime.  As a result, although the environmental conservation 
statutes of Australia, Germany, and the United States have parallel 
origins in the movement toward centralized authority over 
conservation, the text of the Australian statute is shaped by a 
heightened concern for state involvement, while the statutory text 
 
34 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997) (“The Federal 
Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory 
program.”) (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992)). 
35 See Dale D. Goble, The Property Clause: As If Biodiversity Mattered, 75 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 1195, 1233 (2004) (explaining that these two cooperative federalism 
tactics are constitutional because states have the right not to participate). 
36 Anthropocentric concerns about ownership and control dominated wildlife 
law until the twentieth century.  See Thomas A. Lund, Early American Wildlife Law, 
51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 703, 705–06 (1976) (recounting the history of American wildlife 
law, beginning with hunting laws based on the free taking principle, which were 
considered necessary for human survival in the American wilderness). 
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of the ESA remains an artifact of the 1970s fervor for centralized 
environmental policy. 
4.1. The Twentieth Century: Conservation Objective and Shift from 
State to National Law 
Prior to the twentieth century, the U.S. federal government did 
little through legislation to directly protect species,37 and early 
efforts to protect wildlife were carried out by the states.  This was 
also true of Australia and Germany, despite the fact that there were 
early efforts in these countries to form national policy to protect 
fauna.38 
State legislatures in the United States and abroad were first to 
enact substantial policy for the protection of species for reasons 
other than their value as game.  The pioneering nature of these 
laws was the concern their provisions evidenced with the 
persistence of populations of flora and fauna in the wild, instead of 
the rules regarding capture of wildlife.  This marked an important 
change in the popular conception of man’s relationship to nature:  
man was no longer primarily a hunter partaking of nature’s 
unlimited stores, but instead a steward with the power to eradicate 
or preserve entire species.  This change led to new developments in 
the mechanisms by which wildlife law achieved its objectives, and 
new concerns about the proper level of government to administer 
environmental policy. 
When states began to innovate in conservation policy, the 
designation of protected areas was an early conservation tool.  
National parks were a federal invention in the United States, but in 
 
37 A few federal laws were enacted, such as an 1868 Act prohibiting killing of 
certain animals in the Alaskan territory, and the indirect protection afforded by 
the Forest Reserve Act of 1891, which set aside land to be designated as forest 
reserves.  See Shannon Petersen, Comment, Congress and Charismatic Megafauna: A 
Legislative History of the Endangered Species Act, 29 ENVTL. L. 463, 467–68 (1999) 
(noting that the federal government focused on natural resources outside of state 
jurisdiction rather than concentrating efforts on wildlife management). 
38 For instance, the ornithologists’ efforts to protect native birds in Australia 
proved futile primarily due to a lack of consensus among the states, and the 
receptiveness of a few individual state governments to legislation protecting 
fauna led the environmental lobby to strategically focus its efforts on state and 
territory governments.  See DREW HUTTON & LIBBY CONNORS, A HISTORY OF THE 
AUSTRALIAN ENVIRONMENT MOVEMENT 40–43 (1999) (adding that a concurrent 
response by the environmentalist movement was to “improve public education 
strategies”). 
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Germany and Australia the states were pioneers in establishing 
these areas.  National parks in Australia predate the Federation, 
and most of the national parks in Australia are still administered 
by state authorities.39  Similarly, in Germany, Bavaria enacted 
progressive legislation designating Germany’s first national forest, 
the Bavarian Forest National Park.40 
The German system ensures that the administration of all 
national parks is the exclusive responsibility of the Länder.  This 
particular designation has become more popular in recent years, 
leading to the designation of the Kellerwald-Edersee National Park 
in the western part of North Hessen.41  Although a hybrid system 
could have arisen in the United States in which the federal 
government was considered a landowner subject to the several 
states’ laws, this conception has been consistently rejected.  The 
federal government owns, and administers the protection of, 
national parks.42 
Once legislators in Australia began to perceive the necessity of 
increased government intervention in conservation, states utilized 
their ability to quickly adopt progressive policies.  For example, the 
state of Victoria enacted one of the progenitors of comprehensive 
conservation legislation in the Federation, again demonstrating the 
pioneering nature of state-level legislation.43  The Victoria Flora 
and Fauna Guarantee Act of 1988 was explicitly set up with an eye 
toward the economic objections associated with listing an 
endangered species, and its provisions responded to these 
 
39 See BOER & WIFFEN, supra note 2, at 227 (noting that the Australian 
Government administers only a few parks in the Territories).  
40 Jens Brüggemann, National Parks and Protected Area Management in Costa 
Rica and Germany: A Comparative Analysis, in SOCIAL CHANGE & CONSERVATION 71, 
80 (Krishna B. Ghimire & Michel P. Pimbert eds., reprint 2000) (1997) (presenting 
a brief history of the park). 
41 See Tobias Hellenbroich, The Designation of National Parks in German Nature 
Conservation Law, in VALUATION AND CONSERVATION OF BIODIVERSITY: 
INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 133, 
134 (Michael Markussen et al. eds., 2005) (noting that “other areas in Germany are 
being recommended national park status”) (citing FÖNAD 1997, 285ff). 
 42 See Goble, supra note 35, at 1202–03 (referring to congressional and judicial 
affirmations of the Federal Government’s dominion over public land). 
43 See KRISTIN M. JAKOBSSON & ANDREW K. DRAGUN, CONTINGENT VALUATION 
AND ENDANGERED SPECIES: METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES AND APPLICATIONS 11 (1996) 
(crediting the Act with creating a process for individuals and groups to nominate 
an ecological entity or community for protection). 
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concerns.  Action statements and management plans explicitly took 
into account social and economic considerations.44 
The state’s willingness to make a concession—incorporating 
considerations favored by development interests, although 
producing a statute less attractive to environmental interests, 
allowed the state to enact progressive conservation legislation long 
before similar viable national legislation was enacted. 
The establishment of state agencies in Australia to oversee the 
implementation of comprehensive policy also predated equivalent 
national agencies.  Since the 1960s all territory and state 
governments in Australia have established agencies charged with 
the administration of environmental matters, with varying names 
and functions.45  However, this is not true of the state-centric 
German system.  There, the Länder have generally not established 
special authorities for the administration of nature protection, and 
have instead integrated this function in existing authorities 
responsible for inner administration.46 
Until the 1960s and 1970s, state legislation in these three 
countries was primarily relied upon for the enactment of 
conservation policy, and the national legislatures lacked an 
impetus to consolidate in the federal government the power to 
legislate on conservation matters.  This changed, beginning with 
comprehensive federal environmental policy in the United States.  
Environmental legislation entered a new era during the 1960s and 
1970s, as evidenced by several federal comprehensive statutes in the 
United States and abroad.47  This may be viewed as an inevitable 
outgrowth of the expanding conservation consciousness as well, 
since federal usurpation of legislative authority in this area is an 
 
44 Those listings are recommended by a government-independent statutory 
body, which reduces delays for economic concerns.  See id.  
45 See APLIN, supra note 28, at 167–68 (remarking however that governments 
retain the power to overrule the decisions and actions of such agencies). 
46 See SCHLEMMINGER & MARTENS, supra note 33, at 142 (discussing the 
authorities in Germany). 
47 In Europe, the prominence of environmental concerns was recognized 
when the Council of Europe declared 1970 the “European Year of Nature 
Conservation.”  See ALEXANDRE KISS & DINAH SHELTON, MANUAL OF EUROPEAN 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 182–83 (2d ed. 1997) (discussing a variety of measures that 
European countries have taken to protect the environment on the federal level, 
such as Austria’s federal restrictions on the animal and plant trade). 
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obvious way to attempt to achieve one of the most prominent 
desiderata of any conservation regime:  uniformity. 
The beginning of the movement to centralization was the 
enactment of the ESA, designated by the Supreme Court as “the 
most comprehensive legislation for the preservation of endangered 
species ever enacted by any nation.”48  One historian has justifiably 
called it the “Magna Carta of the environmental movement.”49  
Although not the first piece of legislation to focus on the direct 
protection of specific species, at the time of enactment, the ESA 
was certainly the most extensive legislation to focus on the 
persistence of threatened species of wildlife.  Further, the ESA and 
similar national comprehensive efforts to preserve and restore 
biodiversity reflected the modern concern for the existential value 
of biodiversity for the sake of biodiversity.50  This concern is a 
distinguishing feature of the modern era of nature conservation 
that is shared by all of the subsequent national regimes. 
Following the enactment of the ESA in the United States, in 
Germany the Federal Nature Conservation Act was one of several 
pieces of legislation that formed a suite of environmental 
protection regime in the 1970s.  At the time of its passage, members 
of a new reform-oriented coalition government recognized the 
successes of United States environmental initiatives on a federal 
level.51  The original Federal Nature Conservation Act was enacted 
on December 20, 1976, and has been amended four times. 
4.2. The EPBC Act: Federalism Concerns Shape the National 
Conservation Statute in Australia 
For several decades following the enactment of federal 
conservation regimes abroad, Australia did not follow suit.  This 
position was sustained in part by unique concerns about the 
 
48 See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978) (reaffirming that the 
U.S. Congress intended for the Endangered Species Act of 1973 to direct all 
Federal agencies to act in the consideration of protecting endangered animals). 
49 Interview by Lisa McRae with Kevin Starr, Cal. State Librarian Emeritus, in 
Sacramento, Cal., in WATER ON THE EDGE (Water Education Foundation 2005). 
50 See HUTTON & CONNORS, supra note 38, at 196 (explaining that for 
conservationists, biodiversity became “almost an absolute value in itself”). 
51 See KELEMEN, supra note 10, at 82 (2004) (attributing a series of ecological 
crises and the popular responses to them as another factor in the coalition 
government’s initiatives). 
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exercise of federal power.  To the frustration of the states and 
territories, the Australian Commonwealth government acted upon 
its newly clarified powers in the environmental arena during the 
1980s with vigor, halting various activities within states through 
coercive means.52 
The suddenness of the federal government’s appearance within 
the concurrent legislative sphere of the states, along with the 
unilateral nature of its actions, generated political resistance from 
the state governments that was not seen in either Germany or the 
United States.  Tension arose after the Queensland government 
refused to halt logging activity in one such newly designated 
World Heritage Site, which it was ordered to do in accordance 
with a Commonwealth ban approved by the High Court.53  
Subsequently, the states opposed similar actions taken by the 
Commonwealth pursuant to its constitutional authority.54 
These instances of conflict were factors influencing a decision 
by the Hawke Government to undertake efforts to improve 
intergovernmental cooperation, which would influence future 
legislation.55  The states also began to recognize the concurrent (as 
opposed to coordinate) nature of environmental policy, evidenced 
by statements of state-level Premiers calling for cooperation.56  
After a series of conferences beginning in 1990, representatives 
 
52 An example would be threatening to nominate an area as a World Heritage 
Site. 
53 See KELEMEN, supra note 10, at 111–12 (mentioning the statements by the 
Queensland government that the Commonwealth government would have to 
enforce the measures with national military and police forces). 
54 These included conflicts over the tropical rainforest in North Queensland, 
efforts to prevent woodchipping in Tasmanian forests, and the Kakadu National 
Park in the Northern Territory.  See Aynsley Kellow, Thinking Globally and Acting 
Federally: Intergovernmental Relations and Environmental Protection in Australia, in 
FEDERALISM AND THE ENVIRONMENT: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICYMAKING IN AUSTRALIA, 
CANADA, AND THE UNITED STATES 135, 146 (Kenneth M. Holland et al. eds., 1996) 
(recording that in all these cases of State and Territory opposition, a useful model 
for environmental management in the Australian Federal system failed to 
emerge). 
55 See KELEMEN, supra note 10, at 114 (blaming the lack of federal 
infrastructure required for quotidian “implementation and enforcement” of 
environmental policy). 
56 Premier Nick Greiner of New South Wales gave a speech in 1990 calling for 
a more cooperative approach with the Commonwealth.  See Kellow, supra note 54, 
at 149 (considering Greiner’s call for cooperation to be the most influential due to 
his position as a leader in the Liberal party). 
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from all nine governments signed an Intergovernmental 
Agreement on the Environment (“IGAE”) in 1992, which set out 
environmental areas of responsibility in order to avoid duplication 
of decisionmaking.57  As an example of the effect of this agreement, 
pursuant to the IGAE, the Commonwealth is now obligated to 
consult with the State before proposing an area for listing.58 
The development of national policy on conservation 
culminated in the enactment of the EPBC Act on July 17, 2000.  The 
final bill received ardent criticism from some members of the 
Australian Greens (“the Greens Party”), an environment-focused 
political party formed in 1992 with its roots in state-level greens 
parties,59 due to a perceived “disempower[ment of] the federal 
government,”60 as well as opposition from the Australian Labor 
Party (“ALP”).  A majority held by a center-right political party 
nevertheless was able to claim the triumph of passing the most 
comprehensive national environmental assessment regime to 
date.61 
 
57 See APLIN, supra note 28, at 170 (specifying the avoidance of redundant 
State and Federal decisionmaking as a primary concern); see also BOER & WIFFEN, 
supra note 2, at 93 (noting the more uniform acceptance of which areas of heritage 
protection fall within Federal and within State and Territory jurisdiction following 
the passage of the IGAE). 
58 See G. M. BATES, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN AUSTRALIA 340 (4th ed. 1995) 
(referring to the previous tension between the Commonwealth’s ability to propose 
areas for protection despite State objections and the Commonwealth’s capacity to 
enforce protective measures). 
59 See IAN THOMAS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: AUSTRALIAN PRACTICE IN THE 
CONTEXT OF THEORY 38 (2007) (discussing the reasons for the formation of the 
Australia Green Party). 
60 See Cth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 29 April 1999 (Bob Brown, Senator, 
Tas) (Austl.) (indicting State governments as retarding Australia’s efforts to 
develop the economy and fight global warming, in a speech given during the 
Second Reading on the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation 
Bill 1998 [1999]).  Senator Bob Brown of Tasmania provided perfervid criticism of 
the bill and the proceedings generally.  See also Cth, Parliamentary Debates, 
Senate, 22 June 1999 (Robert Hill, Senator, SA and Min. for the Env’t & Heritage) 
(Austl.) (“I would have thought that the Australian Greens would be in here 
demanding contemporary environment laws for this country.  But of course they 
are not interested in the structure of government; they are not interested in the 
cooperative models. All they are interested in is confrontation . . . .”). 
61 See id. (“[F]or the first time we also included a bill for biological 
conservation in this country to protect our biodiversity.  Its time had come.  
Regrettably the Australian Labor Party, although it had entered into the 
international convention on biodiversity and the national strategy, had not got 
around to upgrading Commonwealth law in this regard.”). 
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This landmark environmental legislation replaced its 
predecessors in the area of national species protection62 with a 
regime that incorporates extensive enforcement and listing 
mechanisms, which are detailed in the next Section.  The EPBC 
Act’s explicit objectives in the area of biodiversity are very similar 
to those of the ESA, though the EPBC Act employs different means 
to reach those objectives. 
5. THE RESULTING PROVISIONS: DECENTRALIZED AUSTRALIAN AND 
GERMAN REGIMES AND A CENTRALIZED AMERICAN REGIME 
The resulting federal statutes share similar objectives, but the 
ESA stands out as a singularly centralized system, owing its 
strength to less prevailing political suspicion, at the time of its 
enactment, about the encroachment of a powerful federal 
government on state interests related to the environment.  Further, 
in Australia and Germany, state-level cooperation is particularly 
important, as the effects of one state’s dissent are not diffused by 
the cooperation of forty-nine other states.  The small number of 
states makes intergovernmental politics a prominent feature of the 
statutory provisions,63 and the restrained federal power is 
manifested in provisions that take a more indirect route to species 
protection than the ESA. 
As regimes born from the same general concerns for the 
existential value of biodiversity, their explicit objectives in the area 
of biodiversity share many similarities.  A central textual objective 
of the ESA was to “conserve,” which encompasses both protection 
and recovery, and is a concept that resonates throughout its 
counterparts abroad.  Section 3(1)(c) of the EPBC Act requires the 
promotion of the conservation of biodiversity, which, when 
viewed in light of 3(2)(e)(i), includes not only preservation but also 
the recovery of endangered species.  Article 1 of the general 
provisions of the German Act begins:  “In view of their own value . 
. . nature and landscape both inside and outside the areas of 
human settlement shall be conserved, managed, developed and, 
 
62 The EPBC Act replaced the Endangered Species Protection Act 1993 and 
the Australian Wildlife Protection Act 1998.  See Environment Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) (Austl.). 
63 See Kellow, supra note 54, at 139 (discussing intergovernmental 
relationships in Australia). 
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where necessary, restored in order to safeguard on a lasting basis . 
. . fauna and flora . . . .”  The common objective of conserving 
biodiversity is what distinguishes the compared provisions from 
other environmental policy. 
An important distinction is the similar omnibus nature of the 
provisions of the EPBC Act and the German Act when compared to 
the ESA.  Where the ESA is concerned exclusively with the 
protection of species, nature protection generally is the goal of the 
other statutes, including the conservation of biodiversity.  Even 
beyond “nature” the German Act is concerned also with the 
general protection of “landscapes” (Landschaftspflege).64 
The ESA’s eighteen sections are simple to navigate compared to 
the maze of cross-references between the general provisions of the 
German Act and the substantive provisions.  However, the 
German Act is outdone in this regard by the exceptionally complex 
EPBC Act, which repealed more than a half a dozen pieces of 
Commonwealth environment legislation and incorporated their 
areas of concern.65  The EPBC Act incorporates language and 
concepts from the CBD and a multi-layered approach to species 
protection, recognizing the value of genetic diversity, species 
diversity, and ecosystem diversity.66 
The German and Australian regimes, because of the 
international obligations in which they arose, take a broader 
approach to biodiversity conservation that also includes the 
designation of protected areas other than critical habitat.  These 
designations are the true source of their power to protect 
biodiversity.  The EPBC Act is primarily thought of as a national 
scheme for Environmental Impact Assessments (“EIAs”),67 which 
in the United States were accomplished through the National 
Environmental Policy Act.  The conservation power of the EPBC 
 
64 German Federal Nature Conservation Act, supra note 33, art. 13(1). 
65 See BOER & WIFFEN, supra note 2, at 142 (discussing the impact of the EPBC 
Act). 
66 See id. (discussing the EPBC Act). 
67 See ALLAN HAWKE, AUSTL. GOV’T DEP’T OF THE ENV’T, WATER, HERITAGE & 
THE ARTS, THE AUSTRALIAN ENVIRONMENT ACT: REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW 
OF THE ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION AND BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION ACT 1999, at 18 
[¶¶ 119, 120] (2009) [hereinafter HAWKE FINAL REPORT], available at 
http://www.environment.gov.au/epbc/review/publications/pubs/final-
report.pdf (recommending a national environmental management system to aid 
in efficiencies of the environmental impact assessment). 
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Act originates from these assessments.  Unlike the U.S. version, 
assessments are required for even non-federal actions, and contain 
substantive requirements. 
The procedure for assessment in the EPBC Act specifies seven 
“matter[s] of national environmental significance,” which are each 
in some way supported by the heads of power, as well as two 
exceptions.  The exceptions allow for greater cooperation with the 
state governments; the assessment or approval of any project that 
falls under state “bilateral agreements” may be delegated to the 
state authorities.68 
By way of these assessments, limitations on the federal power 
to directly protect species through listing and “takings” provisions 
did not preclude the Australian government from enacting a form 
of legislation that may prove to be the most effective method of 
halting development to preserve biodiversity.  Where takings of 
non-federal land were considered a constitutional exercise of 
Congress’ power in Gibbs,69 the Australian courts have not yet 
recognized such expansive Federal authority.  As a result, under 
Section 196(1)(d), a necessary element of liability is “the member 
[of a species or ecological community] is in or on a Commonwealth 
area.” 
However, the EPBC Act indirectly accomplishes a similar result 
by designating nationally listed threatened species and ecological 
communities as one of the “matter[s] of national environmental 
significance” that may require approval from the Federal Minister.  
Under the EPBC Act, consultation is required if an “action has, will 
have, or is likely to have, a significant impact on a matter of 
national environmental significance.”  But unlike Section 9 of the 
ESA, “significant impact” does not contemplate the taking of a 
single plant or animal, but rather contemplates actions that, for 
 
68 See Lansen v Minister for Env’t & Heritage (2008) 174 FCR 14, 22 (Austl.) 
(“[T]o achieve its objects, the EPBC Act strengthens intergovernmental 
cooperation, and minimises duplication, through bilateral agreements (s 3(2)(b)) 
and provides for the intergovernmental accreditation of environmental 
assessment and approval processes (s 3(2)(c)).  However, in terms of process, 
timeliness is important in the overall scheme of the EPBC Act.”). 
69 See Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 483 (4th Cir. 2000) (affirming the 
constitutionality of regulations limiting takings). 
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example, will possibly “lead to a long-term decrease in the size of a 
population.”70 
In Germany, protected areas similarly figure prominently in 
the conservation regime, although designation is generally the 
responsibility of the Länder.  The categories of protected areas, such 
as nature reserves and national parks, are laid down in Sections 12 
through 19 of the German Act.  Some critics might suspect that the 
state-level authority to designate national parks would be affected 
by parochial decisionmaking.  However, this system has yielded 
enviable results,71 though often fragmented by political 
boundaries.  A substantial portion of protected areas in Germany 
are national parks. 
A common feature of all three regimes is the listing of 
threatened species on both a state and federal level, although the 
listing process and content varies.  The lists maintained by the 
Länder, and to a greater degree the Australian states, are generally 
more comprehensive than national lists in both countries.  
Although state agencies in the United States also maintain lists of 
threatened species, these lists generally include few state-specific 
species. 
In Germany, listing decisions on a national level are in part 
encumbered by procedure.  Where listing decisions under the ESA 
must undergo a notice and comment procedure but do not require 
further approval, species given “special protection” under Article 
52 may be designated “with the consent of the Bundesrat provided 
that the species concerned are native species whose survival in 
Germany is endangered due to human acts or activities,” if they 
 
70 AUSTL. GOV’T DEP’T OF THE ENV’T, WATER, HERITAGE & THE ARTS, MATTERS 
OF NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL SIGNIFICANCE: SIGNIFICANT IMPACT GUIDELINES 1.1, at 
10 (2009), available at http://www.environment.gov.au/epbc/publications/pubs/ 
nes-guidelines.pdf. 
71 With regard to IUCN Management Protected Areas, which are specifically 
“dedicated to the protection and maintenance of biological diversity” as of 2003, 
31.7% of the total land area of Germany is designated as a protected area, 
compared to 7.5% of Australia or 15.8% of the U.S.  Compare Biodiversity and 
Protected Areas—Germany, supra note 7, at 1, with Biodiversity and Protected Areas—
Australia, EARTHTRENDS, 1 (2003), http://earthtrends.wri.org/pdf_library/ 
country_profiles/bio_cou_036.pdf, and Biodiversity and Protected Areas—United 
States, EARTHTRENDS, 1 (2003), http://earthtrends.wri.org/pdf_library/ 
country_profiles/ bio_cou_840.pdf. 
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are not already listed under an applicable Directive.72  These 
restrictions on listing provide less flexibility for the Federal 
Minister in listing decisions. 
Like the ESA, the regulations passed pursuant to the German 
Act provide for only two levels of protection: “special protection” 
and “strict protection.”73  A national Red List is issued from the 
federal government by the Ministry for the Environment 
(Bundesministerium für Umwelt or BMU), but the Länder maintain 
extensive Red Lists as well, which serve as a “data source for 
national red lists.”74  This results in considerable fragmentation, as 
the land lists are much longer than the national lists and provide 
differing designations for different species.  The limited number of 
status designations established in the German Act contrasts with 
the broad spectrum of designations available under the EPBC Act.  
The existence of this spectrum may be less important in Germany 
where considerable conservation resources provided by the 
Federal Agency for Nature Conservation (Bundesamt für 
Naturschutz or BfN) and state level ministries may be directed 
toward a comparatively manageable number of species. 
The concern for restraining the Australian Commonwealth’s 
power produced yet another variation on listing decisions.  Listing 
in Australia is a fragmented and complicated system.  There are 
inconsistencies between state-level regimes, where the majority of 
species are listed.75  Not only are threatened species divided into 
degrees, but “ecological communities” and “key threatening 
 
72 German Federal Nature Conservation Act, supra note 33, art. 52.  Species 
listed in Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 are incorporated through 
Art. 10(2)(10).  See Council Directive 92/43, art. 10, 1992 O.J. (L 206) (EC). 
73 See WISIA Online—An Overview, WISIA, § 2, http://mail.azl-inc.com/ 
Einleitung.en.html (last updated July 1, 2008) (providing explanation regarding 
status of protection). 
74 For example, of about forty thousand animal and plant species of Lower 
Saxony ten thousand species are listed as threatened.  See Rote Listen, NLWKN, 
http://www.nlwkn.niedersachsen.de/master/C6645300_N5512577_L20_D0_ 
I521158.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2012) (translated). 
75 See Species Information Partnerships: Sharing Knowledge on Threatened Species, 
AUSTL. GOV’T DEP’T ENV’T & HERITAGE, (2006), http://www.environment.gov.au/ 
soe/2006/publications/emerging/species-listing/pubs/species-listing.pdf (last 
visited Apr. 14, 2012) (explaining that because “different jurisdictions manage 
threatened species according to different laws . . . it is difficult to compare 
threatened species lists across jurisdictions”). 
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processes”76 are to be maintained by the Minister.  Particular listing 
decisions are generally within the sole discretion of the Minister,77 
and six categories of threatened species are recognized for listing. 
The prominence of state governments in Australia, as in 
Germany, naturally leads to the need for cooperation in order to 
accomplish conservation goals.  In Australia, this takes the form of 
bilateral agreements between the states and the federal 
government, which are an integral part of the EPBC Act.78  State 
accreditation pursuant to the bilateral process has been 
implemented to reduce duplication.79 
The Minister is granted the power to enter into a bilateral 
agreement on behalf of the Commonwealth in Section 45(1).  As 
part of the accreditation process, a copy of the agreement must be 
“laid before” each House of Parliament,80 and the agreement will 
fail if either House passes a resolution disallowing the agreement 
within fifteen sitting days after notice.81 
As an example, a bilateral agreement between the Queensland 
government and the Commonwealth allowed the state to assess the 
controversial Traveston Dam project, which had the potential to 
adversely impact a matter of national significance—the nationally 
listed Australian lungfish.  However, the final decision was not 
delegated to the state authorities.  On December 2, 2009 the Federal 
Minister denied approval of the project to the chagrin of state 
officials.82 
 
76 See Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) s 
188(3) (Austl.) (“A process is a threatening process if it threatens, or may threaten, 
the survival, abundance or evolutionary development of a native species or 
ecological community.”). 
77 This does not include “ecological communities” recognized as threatened 
in State or Territory lists pursuant to Section 185, which “are to be added.”  
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) s 185 (Austl.). 
78 Bilateral agreements are set out in Sections 44–65.  Environment Protection 
and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) ss 44–66 (Austl.). 
79 Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) s 3(2)(b) 
(Austl.) (“[To achieve its objects, the Act] strengthens intergovernmental 
cooperation, and minimizes duplication, through bilateral agreements.”). 
80 Id. at s 46(4). 
81 Id. at s 46(6). 
82 See Press Release, Minister for the Env’t, Heritage & the Arts, Traveston 
Dam Gets Final No (Dec. 2, 2009), available at http://www.environment.gov.au/ 
minister/archive/env/2009/pubs/mr20091202a.pdf (describing the Federal 
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In Germany, since implementation is in the hands of the Länder, 
provisions that specifically mandate interstate cooperation in part 
alleviate concern about fragmentation in the designation of 
protected areas.  Importantly, Article 17 of the German Act calls for 
cooperation among the Länder in developing the required 
“landscape plans,” which fulfill international obligations83 and 
provide for the protection of wild flora and fauna.84  In 
implementing measures to “monitor” important ecosystems, the 
Federal Government and the Länder “shall provide mutual support 
to one another.”85  This cooperation among the Länder in planning 
will likely be essential to a new national focus to establish a “Green 
Belt” of protected area occupying the region that once bordered 
either side of the former Iron Curtain.86 
Turning finally to the United States, although there was much 
concern over the intrusion of federal authority into state 
prerogatives in the debate over the passage of the ESA, the 
provisions for state involvement were half-hearted.87  The Act 
includes a weak mandate that “Secretary shall cooperate to the 
maximum extent practicable with the States,” and Section 6 does 
provide for the formation of broad “cooperative agreements.”  The 
content of these agreements, however, is unclear and the Section as 
a whole is confusing.88  The impact of these agreements on 
 
Environment Minister’s concern that going forward with the dam project would 
threaten the conservation of biodiversity). 
83 See German Federal Nature Conservation Act, supra note 33, art. 32 
(“Articles 32 to 38 serve the establishment and protection of the European 
ecological network ‘Natura 2000’ . . . . The federal states shall meet their 
obligations under Council Directives 92/43/EEC and 79/409/EEC . . . .”). 
84 See id. art. 14(1)(4)(b)–(c) (providing for the protection of wild flora and 
fauna). 
85 Id. at art. 12(3). 
86 See NATIONAL STRATEGY ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, supra note 6, at 112 
(detailing plans to conserve and protect the “Green Belt” along the former Iron 
Curtain as part of the country’s natural heritage and also as a historical 
monument). 
87 Legislators like Representative Dingell, a key sponsor of the final bill, 
assured detractors that the ESA would not preempt the states from enacting their 
own biodiversity legislation.  See Petersen, supra note 37, at 474. 
88 See MICHAEL ALLEN WOLF, STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SUCCESS IN AN 
UNCERTAIN JUDICIAL CLIMATE 332 (2005) (pointing out that although Section 6(g) 
appears to conceivably allow less-restrictive state “take” provisions, Section 6(f) 
appears to conflict with this by preempting such provisions). 
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conservation is minimal.  This is in part due to Congress’ neglectful 
appropriation for the purpose of the federal fund established by 
Section 6(i),89 but is also certainly a reflection on the weakness of 
state influence combined with plenary congressional power. 
6. IMPLEMENTATION: HOW THE AUSTRALIAN STATES RETAINED 
AND THEN LOST THEIR AUTHORITY OVER SPECIES PROTECTION 
The species protection provisions of the EPBC Act have 
generally received scathing criticism after the first decade of 
implementation.90  As a result of excessive administrative 
discretion and broad interpretation of matters that fall within the 
assessment authority of the Commonwealth, critics claim that the 
regime has been implemented in an unpredictable and ineffectual 
manner.  Some of the most prominent criticisms of the regime 
include:  lack of political will for effectual enforcement, 
unpredictable enforcement, inefficient amendment to lists, and 
politically-motivated decisions regarding listing and final project 
approvals.  These shortfalls are linked to the underutilization of 
state accreditation processes, which legislators included to carry 
out the cooperative intent of the EPBC Act. 
 
89 See 1 DALE D. GOBLE ET AL., THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AT THIRTY: 
RENEWING THE CONSERVATION PROMISE 8 (2005) (discussing the purpose of the 
section). 
90 See Andrew Macintosh & Debra Wilkinson, Environment Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act: A Five Year Assessment, at vii (Austl. Inst., Discussion 
Paper No. 81, 2005) [hereinafter Macintosh & Wilkinson, A Five Year Assessment], 
available at https://www.tai.org.au/file.php?file=discussion_papers/DP81.pdf 
(“In almost all areas, the regime has failed to produce any noticeable 
improvements in environmental outcomes.”); Andrew Macintosh, Environment 
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act: An Ongoing Failure 2 (Austl. Inst., 2006) 
[hereinafter Macintosh, An Ongoing Failure], https://www.tai.org.au/ 
documents/downloads/WP91.pdf (finding no evidence of significant 
improvement in the operation of the EAA regime); Andrew Macintosh & Debra 
Wilkinson, EPBC Act—The Case for Reform, 10 AUSTRALASIAN J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 
& POL’Y 139 (2005) (criticizing the species protection provisions of the EAA regime 
and recommending a switch to landscape assessments by way of reform); Stephen 
Keim, The EPBC Act Ten Years On: the Gunns Method of Assessment Case as a Key 
Indicator: notes for a QELA Seminar held on Monday 29 June 2009, at 12, available at 
http://cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/qela_epbc_complete__21_06_09.pdf (“The 
EPBC Act looked green and shiny, ten years ago.  With the wisdom of experience, 
in the words of the post punk music movement, it may be time ‘to rip it up and 
start again.’”). 
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6.1. Commonwealth Implementation of the Assessment Regime 
The notion that assessment decisions are more strictly applied 
when left to federal decisionmakers may be called into question by 
the history of the EPBC Act’s implementation.  The common 
refrain, in the United States and abroad, is that states should not be 
trusted because they are “pro-development.”91  However, in 
Australia, the Commonwealth’s political will to enforce the 
assessment provisions of the EPBC Act has also been questioned.92  
The susceptibility of enforcement to vacillations in political will 
arises in part due to the broad discretion of the Australian 
Environment Minister in the assessment process. 
Although the Minister receives a large number of referrals, the 
Minister has only found a few to be controlled actions,93 and the 
vast majority are eventually approved.94  Although the low 
number of actions considered “controlled” is consistent with the 
 
91 This was a refrain from the opposition during the Senate debates over 
bilateral agreements.  Senator Margaret Reynolds, a Labor member from 
Queensland, candidly expressed her distrust of state decisionmaking.  See Cth, 
Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 22 June 1999, 5959 (Margaret Reynolds, Senator, 
Qld) (Austl.) (“Commonwealth environment powers are far too narrowly defined.  
I have no problem with saying, ‘I don’t trust the states.’  I do not trust state 
governments.  They are smaller, they are more parochial and are far more likely to 
act in a self-interested way.”). 
92 See KAREN BUBNA-LITIC ET AL., BIODIVERSITY, CONSERVATION, LAW & 
LIVELIHOODS: BRIDGING THE NORTH-SOUTH DIVIDE 294–95 (2008) (since only two of 
the fourteen reported cases brought before the courts under the EPBC Act were 
commenced by the federal government, “a question about the political will to 
enforce the EPBC Act arises”); Macintosh, An Ongoing Failure, supra note 90, at 3 
(noting that the EPBC has rarely been enforced and that it has instead been used 
for political purposes); Humane Soc’y Int’l, Submission to the Review of the 
Commonwealth Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act, 1999, 
at 19 (2008) [hereinafter Humane Soc’y Int’l Submission to the EPBC Act Review], 
available at http://www.environment.gov.au/epbc/review/submissions/pubs/ 
182-humane-society-international.pdf (listing efforts “thwarted by a lack of 
political will and a lack of resources . . . and in several cases in the past overt 
political interference.”). 
93 See Macintosh & Wilkinson, A Five Year Assessment, supra note 90, at 8 [§ 
3.2] (finding that a relatively low proportion of referrals are declared to be 
controlled actions). 
94 See id. at 12–14 [§ 3.4] (recommending amendments to the EPBC Act, partly 
to lessen administrative discretion in enforcing the Act, greater enforcement of its 
existing provisions, and increasing funding to further the Act’s environmental 
policies); 2 DEP’T OF THE ENV’T, WATER, HERITAGE & THE ARTS, ANNUAL REPORT 
2007–08, Appendix A (2008) (providing detailed statistics on historical referrals 
and approvals). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol33/iss4/3
03 BURNS (DO NOT DELETE) 4/18/2012  3:14 PM 
2012] FEDERAL ADMINISTRATION 1023 
cooperative purposes of the EPBC Act because this may simply 
leave these decisions to the states, the conspicuously low number 
of denials may also be seen as an indictment of the potency of the 
regime.  Poor enforcement due to a lack of political will is 
exacerbated by a lack of financial resources.  Facing a problem 
familiar to critics of the ESA, the relevant Australian 
Commonwealth department is underfunded.95 
Intermittent enforcement has also contributed to the perception 
that the Commonwealth implementation of the EPBC Act is 
ineffective and tainted by political motivation.  This perception 
was apparent in the content of submissions to the 2009 statutorily 
mandated Independent Review of the Environment Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act (the “Independent Review”).96  For 
example, the Western Australian Government’s submission was 
critical of enforcement under the EPBC Act, since it is 
uncoordinated and seems to “react in response to public 
complaints.”97 
With regard to the assessment mechanism, despite active 
litigation, it appears that the EPBC Act has at best created an 
unpredictable layer of approval above state processes.  To date, 
there have been few successful prosecutions under the assessment 
provisions of the EPBC Act.98  Since the meaning of “significant 
 
95 See Lee Godden & Jacqueline Peel, The Environment Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (CTH): Dark Sides of Virtue, 31 MELB. U. L. REV. 
106, 136 (2007) (identifying chronic underfunding as a continuing obstacle to 
effective administration of the environmental impact assessment in a 2006 Senate 
inquiry which considered amendments to the EPBC Act); Humane Soc’y Int’l 
Submission to the EPBC Act Review, supra note 92, at 22–23 (arguing that funds to 
the Act’s relevant section should be significantly increased). 
96 See HAWKE INTERIM REPORT, supra note 24, at 27 [¶ 2.108] (highlighting a 
public sentiment that significant political interference exists and that the 
Commonwealth Government should assume a more substantial role to ensure 
that environmental standards are not compromised by political considerations). 
97 Submission of Peter Conran, Dir. Gen., Gov’t of W. Austl. Dep’t of the 
Premier & Cabinet, to Allan Hawke, EPBC Act Review Secretariat, Dep’t of the 
Env’t, Water, Heritage & the Arts, ch. 21, para. 2 (Sept. 23, 2009) [hereinafter W. 
Austl. Response to the HAWKE INTERIM REPORT], available at 
http://www.environment.gov.au/epbc/review/comments/pubs/117-wa-
government.pdf. 
98 See Andrew Macintosh, Australia’s National Environmental Legislation: A 
Response to Early, 12 J. INT’L WILDLIFE L. & POL’Y 166, 174 (2009) (noting that 
Greentree has been the only successful case thus far under the Act’s assessments 
provisions). 
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impact” remains ambiguous,99 and the courts have demonstrated 
willingness to impose burdensome penalties for unapproved 
actions that are later found to be “controlled,” Commonwealth 
environmental assessment referrals are now part of almost every 
significant project’s due diligence efforts.  Attempts by the Minister 
to work with state governments to create exemptions to triggering 
have been rebuffed by the courts.100  These triggers can result in 
steep penalties for the farming and fishing industry101 and have yet 
to be overturned in federal court.102 
Many of the Environment Minister’s project approvals appear 
to have been influenced by considerations of political expediency, 
which calls to attention a danger of allowing too much discretion 
in any environmental assessment regime.  The so-called “Bald Hills 
Debacle” is a ready example of a national decisionmaker yielding 
to political pressure instead of making decisions based on 
prescribed factors.  After several years of routine approval of wind 
farm proposals under the EPBC Act assessment process, 
Environment Minister Ian Campbell denied approval of the Bald 
Hills wind farm project in Victoria because of its likely effects on 
the critically endangered orange-bellied parrot.  This was despite 
the fact that the most accurate calculation at the time arrived at the 
conclusion that the wind farm would result in “one dead parrot 
 
99 The first case under the EPBC Act was Booth v Bosworth, (2011) 114 FCR 39 
(“The Flying Fox Case”).  Booth involved the electrocution of flying foxes on a 
lychee farm—foxes had destroyed 50% of previous year’s crop.  A substantial fine 
was levied against the farmer successfully prosecuted under the EPBC Act.  Id.  
The outcome of this case resulted in anxiety among farmers about the threat of 
nuisance litigation.  Open Letter to Farmers: Act Designed to Protect, HERBERT RIVER 
EXPRESS (Austl.), Nov. 8, 2001, at 9. 
100 See Humane Soc’y Int’l v Minister for Env’t and Heritage (2003) 126 FCR 205 
(holding that Ministerial Guidelines, purporting to offer various exemptions from 
EPBC Act review for state permit-holders, exceeded statutory authority). 
101 See, e.g., Minister for Env’t & Heritage v Warne [2007] FCA 599 (holding that 
a fine of AUD 25,000 imposed on a fishing operation was within the permissible 
range of appropriate penalties); Greentree v Minister for Env’t & Heritage (2005) 144 
FCR 388 (holding a fine of AUD 450,000 imposed on a farming operation was well 
below the maximum allowable and properly reflected the deliberate nature of the 
contravention). 
102 See Minister for Env’t Heritage & the Arts v Rocky Lamattina & Sons Pty Ltd 
(2009) 167 LGERA 753 (doubling the penalty on appeal from the original and 
agreed-upon AUD 110,000 to AUD 220,000). 
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every thousand years.”103  In fact, the state assessment process had 
been accredited on a one-time basis to assess the impact of the 
wind farm and its report concluded that the adverse effects were 
negligible.  This state-level assessment was eventually vindicated 
when, facing public outrage, the Minister was allowed to reassess 
the project and reversed his decision.104 
Admittedly, counter-examples do exist.  In contrast to the Bald 
Hills Debacle, the Minister recently blocked a state-approved 
project with truly foreseeable impacts on threatened species.  
Reminiscent of the “Snail Darter case” in the United States in terms 
of financial impact,105 former Environment Minister Peter Garrett 
utilized the assessment provisions of the EPBC Act to block the 
approval of a major project:  a AUD 1.8 billion dam in 
Queensland.106  The Queensland government approved the 
“Traveston Crossing Dam” proposal after extensive assessment 
subject to 1,200 conditions,107 but Garrett ultimately rejected the 
controversial project.108  Garrett based his decision on the potential 
adverse impacts on threatened species, including the vulnerable 
Queensland Lungfish. 
Unlike the Bald Hills Debacle, the loss of habitat from 
inundation, although theoretically mitigated by the agreed-upon 
conditions, was a concern within the realm of reasonable 
 
103 James Prest, The Bald Hills Wind Farm Debacle, in CLIMATE LAW IN 
AUSTRALIA 230, 242 (Tim Bonyhady & Peter Christoff eds., 2007). 
104 See Wind Farm Decision Welcomed, AUSTRALIAN, Dec. 21, 2006, 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/breaking-news/wind-farm-decision-
welcomed/story-fn3dxiwe-1111112723860 (noting that Victoria’s Planning 
Minister Justin Madden has welcomed federal Environment Minister Ian 
Campbell’s belated approval of the project after the Minister’s early opposition, 
which Mr. Madden described as politically motivated and “more about appeasing 
opponents to the wind farm in the marginal federal seat of McMillan than about 
the migrating parrots”). 
105 See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 158–62 (1978) (involving the 
use of Section 7 of the ESA to block the construction of a dam threatening a 
species of fish called Snail Darters). 
106 See Jessica Marszalek, Traveston Dam Receives State Approval, THE AGE, Oct. 
6, 2009, http://news.theage.com.au/breaking-news-national/traveston-dam-
receives-state-approval-20091006-gl23.html (detailing the state’s approval of the 
dam). 
107 Id. 
108 See Press Release, supra note 82 (explaining that Minister Garrett denied 
approval because the impact on threatened species would be excessive). 
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probabilities.109  In other words, this was arguably an example of 
an action that would in fact have a “significant impact” on a 
“matter of national environmental significance”—threatened 
species.  Political motivations also appear less likely given that the 
Minister’s decision denied the pleas of a fellow Australian Labor 
Party member, the Queensland Premier.110  This denial reveals that, 
at least when political motivations do not figure prominently into 
the decisionmaking, the EPBC Act may be used as an effective 
barrier against matters legitimately classified as “matters of 
national environmental significance.” 
Although shifting control over environmental decisions from 
state to national governments has often been justified by 
accusations of parochial decisionmaking at the state level and bias 
in favor of industry, Commonwealth decisions under the EPBC Act 
have not been immune from these influences.  Not only do 
economic considerations explicitly figure into decisionmaking, but 
the recent amendments to the EPBC Act are also intended to 
benefit “development interests,”111 and the Commonwealth 
government has been accused of “pro-development bias.”112  There 
are even accusations that the Ministers have “abused” the process 
to benefit commercial interests.113  Political motivations 
 
109 See Submission of Stuart E. Bunn, Director, Austl. Rivers Inst., Griffith 
Univ., Traveston Crossing Dam, Mary River, SE Qld: QWI Response to Reviewers 
Report III: Reply, to Dep’t of the Env’t, Water, Heritage & the Arts, at 3 (2009), 
available at http://www.environment.gov.au/epbc/notices/assessments/2006/ 
3150/pubs/traveston-dam-further-advice-prof-bunn.pdf (expressing concerns 
about the suitability of the proposed inundated area of the dam as aquatic 
habitat). 
110 See Rosemary Odgers, Bligh Warns No Traveston Dam Means Higher Water 
Prices, COURIERMAIL.COM.AU, Nov. 11, 2009, http://www.couriermail.com.au/ 
news/queensland/bligh-warns-no-traveston-dam-means-higher-water-
prices/story-e6freoof-1225796433876 (“[Queensland Premier] Bligh has told State 
Parliament that the dam was ‘absolutely critical’ to the region’s future water 
security.”). 
111 Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) § 122 
(Austl.). 
112 See Godden & Peel, supra note 95, at 138 (commenting that bringing an 
action under the EPBC Act in Australia’s Federal Court exacts high litigation costs 
on pro-environmentalist plaintiffs, thereby discouraging federal judicial 
enforcement of the Act); see also Macintosh & Wilkinson, A Five Year Assessment, 
supra note 90, at 11 (2005) (explaining that “lack of political will” has contributed 
to a low refusal rate).  
113 See Humane Soc’y Int’l Submission to the EPBC Act Review, supra note 92, 
at 19 (arguing that there has been an “overt political interference and abuse of 
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dramatically affect enforcement due to the broad discretion 
accorded the Environment Minister, and contribute to 
Commonwealth enforcement that is inconsistent with statutory 
purposes.114 
6.2. Listing Decisions Under the EPBC Act 
Listing in Australia since passage of the EPBC Act remains 
divided between seven governments.  There are inconsistencies 
between state and territory regimes, where the majority of species 
are listed,115 which has been a source of criticism.  However, this 
fragmentation was the intended result, even following the passage 
of comprehensive national legislation, in order to benefit from the 
flexibility of separate state listing decisions and to accommodate 
the limits on protection against “takings.”  Since direct takings 
under the EPBC Act remain proscribed exclusively within 
Commonwealth land, lists maintained in each state and territory 
provide needed protection on state land. 
The primacy of the states in listing has in many ways benefited 
the responsiveness of threatened species lists.  Commonwealth 
threatened species lists have been slowly populated and less 
inclusive.  On the national level, 444 fauna, 1342 flora, and 53 
communities are listed.116  As of the date of the Independent Review, 
since the enactment of the EPBC Act absorbed the previous list, 
under the new regime the Commonwealth added “238 species, 12 
 
process”, and noting that the 2006 amendments “legitimized the delays and 
specifically enabled opportunities for politicization of the process”). 
114 See David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The Case 
Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1796, 1805 
(2008) (noting “[m]ost scholars agree that political processes tend to generate 
suboptimally lax environmental regulation” because of the lobbying power of 
commercial interests); William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 108, 114 (2006) (“Every environmental law, regulation, 
implementation and enforcement decision is influenced by the political incentives 
of regulatory stakeholders.”).  
115 See AUSTL. GOV’T DEP’T OF THE ENV’T & HERITAGE, supra note 75, at para. 1 
(noting that the Australian and State and Territory Governments each maintain 
lists of threatened species). 
116 See Species Profile and Threats Database, AUSTL. GOV’T DEP’T SUSTAINABILITY, 
ENV’T, WATER, POPULATION AND COMMUNITIES, http://www.environment.gov.au/ 
cgi-bin/sprat/public/sprat.pl (last visited Apr. 14, 2012) (providing information 
about species and ecological communities listed under the EPBC Act). 
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[key threatening processes] and 25 ecological communities . . . .”117  
These figures may be compared with those of a single state, New 
South Wales, where a list for a regime limited to the state’s 
boundaries includes 295 fauna, 637 flora, 36 key threatening 
processes, and 102 communities.118  Notably, the more listings on 
the Commonwealth level, the closer the regime approaches the 
geographic reach of ESA Section 9 takings, since listings are 
“matters of national environmental significance,” and “triggers” 
for these matters have been broadly interpreted.  For this reason, 
although the sluggish Commonwealth pace indicates that listing 
should not be consolidated, given the broad interpretation of 
“triggers,” slower Commonwealth listing is paradoxically a benefit 
to reduced duplication and efficiency. 
The response to the Independent Review submitted by the 
Western Australia Government notes that species listed by the 
Commonwealth have generally tracked the state and territory 
listings of threatened species.119  Some state or territory statutes, 
like the Threatened Species Conservation Act of 1995 in New South 
Wales, likewise provide for immediate consideration of listing 
species already listed through the EPBC Act.120  This reciprocity is a 
benefit of multiple listing processes.  A state or the Commonwealth 
may be able to immediately protect a species within the ambit of its 
jurisdiction, while other government entities with less pressing 
needs to protect the same species may consider categorizing the 
species under a different priority level. 
Notably, the experience of environmental groups with states 
and territories in listing decisions has anecdotally been favorable, 
especially when compared with submissions to the 
 
117 HAWKE FINAL REPORT, supra note 67, at 73 [¶ 2.81]. 
118 See Species, Populations & Ecological Communities of NSW, THREATENED 
SPECIES, http://www.threatenedspecies.environment.nsw.gov.au/index.aspx (last 
visited Feb. 27, 2012). 
119 See W. Austl. Response to the HAWKE INTERIM REPORT, supra note 97, at ch. 
23 (“The concern about the operation of bilateral assessment agreements in 
circumstances where the proponent was closely linked with the State or Territory 
government and there could be a perceived bias or conflict of interest is 
acknowledged.”). 
120 See Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995 (NSW) s 9 (Austl.), available at 
http://www.legislation.nsw.gov.au/fullhtml/inforce/act+101+1995+FIRST+0+#
pt.2-div.1-sec.9 (explaining the “listing of nationally threatened species and 
ecological communities”). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol33/iss4/3
03 BURNS (DO NOT DELETE) 4/18/2012  3:14 PM 
2012] FEDERAL ADMINISTRATION 1029 
Commonwealth.121  The attitude toward Commonwealth 
submissions for listing has been described as “infuriating.”122  The 
existence of multiple lists is important to accommodating the pro-
environmental benefits of environmental groups’ familiarity with 
and favorable opinion of state processes. 
It appears that the Commonwealth listing process, like other 
aspects of the EPBC Act, has not avoided the taint of politically 
expedient decisionmaking.123  Decisions favorable to interest 
groups and the Environment Minister’s veto over listing 
assessment have resulted in a meager few listings.124  The design of 
some state regimes resists these pressures.  Where the 
Commonwealth Minister plays a dominant role in listing approval, 
in New South Wales the Minister may only delay the final decision 
of the Scientific Committee.125  The resulting efficiencies in state 
listing provide some justification for relying in part on state lists, 
despite the resulting fragmentation. 
Listing primarily at a state level, though inherently creating 
fragmentation, has resulted in a flexible national regime in which 
states are able to quickly list and de-list species, ecological 
communities, and key threatening processes.  The Independent 
Review notes that changes to state and territory listings “outstrip[] 
the capacity of the Commonwealth to keep up.”126  Perhaps the 
most prominent example of a disparity between state and 
Commonwealth lists is the ongoing battle over the listing of the 
 
121 See Humane Soc’y Int’l Submission to the Senate Inquiry into the 
Operation of the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999, at 6, 
(Sept. 22, 2008), available at http://www.hsi.org.au/editor/assets/admin/HSI_ 
EPBC_Senate_Submission_Sept08.pdf (“[P]rocesses to list threatened ecological 
communities and threatened species under the NSW . . . and the Victorian . . . 
[Acts][] run comparatively smoothly and efficiently.”). 
122 Id. at 12; see also Macintosh & Wilkinson, A Five Year Assessment, supra note 
90, at 16–19 [§ 3.6] (suggesting that the listing process is ineffectual and exploited 
for political reasons). 
123 See Macintosh, supra note 98, at 175–78 (explaining why listing processes 
are political by design). 
124 See id. at 175 (describing the “reasonably robust listing process”). 
125 Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995 (NSW) s 23A (Austl.), available at 
http://www.legislation.nsw.gov.au/fullhtml/inforce/act+101+1995+FIRST+0+#
pt.2-div.3-sec.23a (last visited Apr. 14, 2012). 
126  HAWKE FINAL REPORT, supra note 67, at 74 [¶ 2.83]. 
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koala,127 which is listed as vulnerable in New South Wales and 
Queensland, but is not yet listed under the national EPBC Act list.  
An agile state-centric listing process conserves resources by 
facilitating swift protection tailored for the unique populations in 
each state, and easier de-listing when a population is no longer 
threatened in a certain state. 
7. CREATURES OF THE STATES: THE CONCEPTUAL REASONS FOR 
STATE INVOLVEMENT 
The consensus is that the American and Australian species 
protection regimes have produced sub-optimal results.  Criticisms 
are tied directly to a central deficiency of these regimes as 
implemented:  the alienation of the states from meaningful 
involvement in the administration of conservation policy.  The 
history of the Australian conservation regime provides examples of 
both the advantages of state involvement and disadvantages of a 
centralized conservation regime. 
7.1. Advantages of State Primacy in Administration of Conservation 
Policy 
The enactment of progressive or at least cutting edge state 
conservation policy is an advantage of incentivizing state 
participation in developing species protection policy.  Where the 
ingenuity of state processes has been harnessed, cutting edge 
policy has been enacted before passage on a national level is 
attainable. 
For example, a prominent criticism of the Commonwealth’s 
operation of the EPBC Act has been legislators’ resistance to use its 
potential to implement climate change policy.128  Although this 
Comment does not purport to evaluate the wisdom of any policy 
 
127 See Koala Decision Postponed, CANBERRA TIMES, Oct. 31, 2011, 
http://www.canberratimes.com.au/environment/conservation/koala-decision-
postponed-20111031-1mrw1.html (describing the controversy over the listing of 
the koala). 
128 See, HAWKE FINAL REPORT, supra note 67, at 10 [¶ 65] (explaining that some 
submissions included managing the threat to biodiversity through regulation of 
climate change); see also Keim, supra note 90 (“It is ironic that, in an age of concern 
about climate change, Australia’s national environment impact assessment statute 
has nothing to say and nothing to do concerning the impact of new developments 
in contributing to climate change.”). 
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addressing climate change, it is a ready example of a cutting edge 
conservation policy that remains difficult to enact on a national 
level in any form.  However, the flexible state legislatures in 
Australia began to implement climate change policy through 
conservation provisions many years ago.129  Although the 
piecemeal adoption of this legislation may be unsatisfying to 
proponents of climate change laws, the states have been much 
quicker to adopt these contentious policies than the national 
legislature.  In New South Wales, where the name of the former 
Department of Water and Energy was appended to include 
“Climate Change” in 2009,130 anthropogenic climate change was 
listed as a key threatening process as early as 2000.131 
Even aside from these developments, in many ways the state 
governments have generally pressured the national government to 
develop stricter and more cutting edge legislation.  This cross-
pollination is an example of the “learning function” of overlapping 
environmental statutes.132  These developments are particularly 
interesting since the reverse was predicted in a study referring to 
conservation policy in the United States.133  In the submissions and 
responses to the Independent Review, several submissions suggested 
that the Commonwealth adopt stricter or more progressive state 
policies. 
 
129 See Robert A. Schapiro, Not Old or Borrowed: The Truly New Blue Federalism, 
3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 33, 42 (2009) (state activity in area of climate change may 
“prod the federal government into action”). 
130 NSW Government Reform, N.S.W. GOV’T, DEP’T PRIMARY INDUSTRIES, OFF. 
WATER, http://www.water.nsw.gov.au/Department-of-Water-and-Energy/dwe/ 
default.aspx (established effective 1 July 2009). 
131 See Anthropogenic Climate Change—Key Threatening Process Listing, N.S.W. 
GOV’T OFF. ENV’T & HERITAGE, http://www.environment.nsw.gov.au/ 
threatenedspecies/HumanClimateChangeKTPListing.htm (explaining the 
findings of the New South Wales Scientific Committee and its rationale for adding 
Anthropogenic Climate Change as a key threatening process to the Threatened 
Species Conservation Act); see also HAWKE FINAL REPORT, supra note 67, at 111–18 
[¶¶ 4.81–4.145] (discussing climate change under the EPBC Act). 
132 See William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 108, 122–23 (2005) (“Similar, but often slightly varied legal regimes, 
allow for some experimentation in implementation and enforcement, as well as 
mimicking of successes.”). 
133 See A. Dan Tarlock, Biodiversity Federalism, 54 MD. L. REV. 1315, 1319 (1995) 
(“Innovative state and local attempts to promote biodiversity are driven by the 
need to comply with federal mandates, primarily the Endangered Species Act.”). 
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For example, in its Response to the Interim Report, the 
Government of Western Australia suggested that the 
Commonwealth could respond to climate change by following the 
state’s example and adding it to the list of key threatening 
processes.134  With regard to listing, the New South Wales 
Government suggested a decoupling of the assessment of risk and 
the prioritization to mirror the operation of the listing process 
under New South Wales legislation.135  This way, the process 
would include scientific concerns while excluding management 
concerns.136  The national legislature has yet to follow these 
recommendations. 
Although the Commonwealth likely does have some influence 
on state policy, the Australian example demonstrates that states 
may be the vanguards of progressive or cutting edge policy, at 
least where environmental concerns are prominent in the public 
consciousness and state-level regimes are well-developed.  Aside 
from the suggested implementation of climate change policy 
through a new matter of national environmental significance—
which would have the undesirable effect of removing sole state 
authority over an even broader range of actions—the 
Commonwealth regime will likely benefit from state innovations 
through future amendments. 
7.2. Proper Role of Federal Administration and Ensuring State 
Involvement 
In the face of Commonwealth encroachment, the Australian 
states have demonstrated a need for allowing greater state control 
 
134 See W. Austl. Response to the HAWKE INTERIM REPORT, supra note 97, at ch. 
8 (explaining the impact climate change has on biodiversity and things that can be 
done to counter those effects). 
135 See Response Submission of John Lee, Dir. Gen., N.S.W. Gov’t, Dep’t of 
Premier & Cabinet, NSW Gov’t Response to the Interim Report of the 
Independent Review of the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 
1999, to Allan Hawke 5 (Sept. 18, 2009) [N.S.W. Gov’t Response to HAWKE INTERIM 
REPORT], available at http://www.environment.gov.au/epbc/review/comments/ 
pubs/116-nsw-government.pdf; but see HAWKE FINAL REPORT, supra note 67, at 
122–23 [¶¶ 5.5–5.10] (this idea was rejected by Hawke). 
136 See N.S.W. Gov’t Response to HAWKE INTERIM REPORT, supra note 135 
(“This review aims to examine the way the agencies interact . . . in order to 
streamline assessment and decision-making while ensuring strong environmental 
outcomes.”). 
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of species protection policy.  States have been at the forefront of 
progressive environmental policy since Federation and have 
agilely listed and de-listed species.  As a slow-moving federal 
behemoth, it is easy to scorn the Australian regime.  However, the 
benefits of the regime recommend it as a second, limited level of 
species protection above state processes.  The Australian model has 
not demonstrated the shortcomings of a truly cooperative species 
protection regime, but has rather exhibited the failings of a 
lukewarm, quasi-centralized regime. 
Concessions for state control are unattractive to those coveting 
legislative jurisdiction as broad as the effects of environmental 
impacts can be imagined.  But a regime that ensures state processes 
remain above an acceptable standard should assuage the concerns 
of all but the most dogmatic advocate of centralized regulation.137  
In a truly cooperative system, the inefficiencies associated with 
fragmentation are theoretically offset by the cross-pollination 
“learning” synergies mentioned above, as well as other benefits.138 
Due to judicial interpretation, the Australian and U.S. 
Constitutions no longer provide for state administration of 
conservation policy.  The history of implementation in Australia 
demonstrates that mechanisms for state involvement in a 
conservation statute may remain dormant because of discretion 
over their utilization.  In order for conservation regimes to fully 
harness the benefits of state involvement, either statutes must 
make state participation discretionary and follow through by fully 
utilizing these provisions, or legislators must design robust 
provisions, ex ante, mandating meaningful state involvement. 
A conservation regime may, of course, simply compel states to 
comply with minimum federal requirements.  But where state 
governments in Australia have been empowered to enact and 
administer conservation policy independently, state legislators 
have surpassed national standards and pressured the national 
legislature to enact cutting edge policies.  In Australia, this 
empowerment arose out of recognition, on the part of legislators 
and various constituencies, that states have had and should 
continue to have a significant role in species protection. 
 
137 See supra note 60 (noting criticism by Senator Brown of Tasmania). 
138 See supra Section 4.2 (describing environmental advocates’ positive 
experiences with state and territory listing processes). 
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8. CONCLUSION 
In its formative years, the EPBC Act, originally shaped by 
political pressures into a cooperative model, was partially divested 
of its restraints on the Commonwealth government through 
judicial interpretation of its assessment mechanisms and 
underutilization of cooperative provisions.  Whether or not 
Australian legislators decide to cabin the scope of Commonwealth 
authority under the EPBC Act, a decade of implementation 
demonstrates some of the detrimental effects of federal 
encroachment upon well-developed state conservation regimes.  
However, “cross-pollination” synergies and other benefits arising 
out of the Australian model indicate the potential of a truly 
cooperative species protection regime.  In the debate concerning 
the proper allocation of authority over conservation, the benefits of 
ensuring independent state involvement deserve recognition. 
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